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P~oductivity gains in a cle~ical setting 
on the o~de~ of ten to twenty-five pe~­
cent can be achieved th~ough the use of 
contingent ti~e off (CTO) incentives. To 
test this hypothesis, fou~ cle~ical 
g~oups who peYfoy~ed ~outine ~epetitive 
tasks we~e given pyoductivity goals of 
25% ove~ thei~ ~espective g~oup's ave~age 
weekly p~oductivity level. If a g~oup 
achieves the weekly goal befo~e the end 
of standaYd 40 hou~ wo~k-week, the g~oup 
of e~ployees will be given ti~e off with 
full pay based upon a specified fo~~ula. 
Results of the study indicate that CTO 
can yesult in p~oductivity incyeases 
~anging between 13 and 40 pe~cent. 
Increasing international and national competition and concern 
over cost control is forcing many companies to look for innovative 
methods to increase employee productivity. One method that has not 
received a great deal of attention in the literature is Contingent 
Time Off (CTO). In this approach, employees are rewarded with time 
off at full pay for meeting increased productivity goals- This 
approach appears to offer management an effective method for ac-
hieving productivity increases in selected business environments 
while, at the same time, sharing the benefits of these increases 
with employees. It also can lead to significant cost reductions 
as productivity increases. 
This study was intended to demonstrate that an incentive in 
the form of CTO can result in significant clerical worker group 
productivity gains. To measure the effects a CTO program has on 
productivity gains, a field study was conducted on four groups of 
clerical employees. All employees performed the same tasks over an 
eight week period and were measured for productivity and quality 
changes. Comparisons were made against pre-test productivity and 
quality measures· CTO time was earned by employees if their re-
spective group reached productivity goals jointly agreed to by 
management and the clerical staff in less than the standard work-
week. 
The company's willingness to participate in the study resulted 
from sEnior management's concern over previous company financial 
losses and the resulting need to find less costly ways of running 
the business. The Sales Accounting department was a prime can-
di date for e>:perimentat i on sin ce it was a I'OU tine "papel"- push i ng" 
area requiring a relatively large number of employees to perform 
the work. 
If eTO resulted in sustainable productivity gains in the 
office environment, a method of increasing office productivity 
would have been found which did not require additional financial 
r-esources· In fact, payroll and related costs could decrease if a 
proven eTO program could be implemented. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature reveals an abundance of incentive 
programs revolving around financial rewards (O'Dell, 1984), 
employee involvement, safety incentives (Minter, 1985) and other-
positive reinforcements. Unfortunately, there is little available 
on eTO. In their review of eTO programs, Lockwood and Luthans 
(1984) cited five private sector experiences with eTO, all of which 
supported the hypothesis that eTO can increase productivity. 
Several of these are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
At one manufacturing plant employing over 2,000 hourly workers 
a eTO program was implemented in a production area. Worker-s and 
management met and agreed to eTO standards which included a 25% 
increase in productiVity and penalties for items manufactured with 
defects. Productivity was measured on a daily basis and if the 
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group met its production goals the entire group could go home. The 
results were impressive with a 25% productivity increase by employ-
ees who worked only an average of 6.5 hours per day. Unfortunate-
ly, a subsequent change in management resulted in termination of 
the program and productivity decreased by 12.5% from the original 
level. Lockwood and Luthans (1984) note that once instituted, a 
eTO program must continue regardless of management changes. Other-
wise, a company should not implement CTa unless it is sp~cifically 
identified as a short term program since the subsequent termination 
of a eTO program could possibly result in actual productivity 
declines. 
Lockeed Shipbuilding and Construction Company used a one-time 
eTO program to reduce safety-related accidents. In this case, 
employees were given a target goal of reducing safety related 
expenses from 15.15% of payroll dollars to 5.0% for which all par-
ticipating employees were to be given two extra days of paid va-
cation. The program was a win-win situation: the company saved 
$4.2 million and the employees received their time off. 
In order to finish year-end production requirements early, one 
high-tech manufacturing firm pro~ised its employees they could have 
as paid time off, any time saved during December if the company met 
a set of production and quality goals. This program resulted in a 
20 percent productivity increase for the company with no change in 
quality and the employees earned an extra two weeks off. 
The process of goal setting by itself has been found to be an 
effective method for improving task performance Locke (1968), 
Latham & YukI (1975), Locke and Latham (1984). Thus, it is pos-
sible that establishing productivity goal increases may be ef-
fective without any incentive. Buller and Bell (1986) state that 
the increases may result from changes in strategies on the part of 
participants to improve. Locke, Shaw, Saari and Latham (1981) 
suggest that goal setting often results in task strategy changes as 
well as skill development and creative problem solving. In a 
laboratory setting, Shaw (1983) found that establishing specific 
goals for subjects led to the development of more Task Strategies 
than under conditions where no goals were set. 
While eTO may prove to be beneficial to both the company and 
employee, positive results could also prove to be a threat to 
employees. Employees perceive that if a job can be done more 
efficiently, jobs will probably be eliminated, possibly theirs. 
As Tuttle and Sink (1985) note, even the mere presence of a produc-
tivity measuring system is threatening to those being evaluated. 
The authors discuss six areas of threat around which employees 
become concerned: misunderstanding or misuse of productivity meas-
urements, exposure to inadequate performance, additional unexpected 
time and reporting demands, distortion of performance, reduction of 
autonomy and reductions in staff. It is the last area, staff 
reductions, which was initially and directly addressed in the 
proposed eTO approach because if a modest increase in productivity 
(10 - 25%) can be achieved, staff reductions through attrition or 
reductions in force will eventually occur. The perceived threat 
(layoff) can lead to resistance to measurement and in fact, em-
ployees could intentionally sabotage the program. As Tuttle and 
Sink point out, a successful productivity measurement system re-
quires skills at managing the resistance to its presence during its 
introduction- A strategy to circumvent possible resistance to 
productivity measurement is to involve employees in the design and 
implementation process- At the same time, a promise to reduce job 
positions through attrition and not layoffs, should help alleviate 
fears y while addressing the realities of cost control and potential 
staff reduction-
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE 
Sample 
The research was conducted using four test groups in a field 
setting over an eight week P[ ~iod. Each group was comprised of 
seven (7) to ten (10) people. The initial test design called for 
the use of control groups; he ever, this approach was discarded 
since the groups could not be isolated to ensure that they were not 
interfering with the results I f other groups being tested. All of 
the employees were clerical workers in an Accounting Department of 
a large (2 billion dollars) national retailer. Their primary 
responsibilities were to audit daily store sales and to correct 
sales related problems for each store in the chain. To accomplish 
these tasksy auditors. are required to review detail sales data 
including sales receipts, gift certificates, credit card receipts, 
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coupons, etc. submitted by the stores and compare them to computer 
generated information. Discrepancies are researched and corrected 
by the auditors. An audit is complete when all discrepancies are 
resolved and paper work is submitted to a supervisor. 
Program Development 
The program was designed with extensive input from employees. 
As suggested by Lockwood and Luthans (1984), for a eTO program to 
work it must be accepted by the participants. If employees feel 
the goals and penalties are such that they cannot possibly earn a 
reward, they will see the program as a sham. Thus, to ensure a 
program which would have the best chance of acceptance by the 
entire staff, the program framework was developed through meetings 
with group supervisors and an informal leader from each of the four 
groups. A number of basic rules were agreed to by both parties 
including: 
1. Each group would have their existing number of required 
weekly audits increased by 25 percent. Thus, if a group 
was required to do 200 audits per week, the goal was 
increased to 250. On a per auditor basis the workload 
(number of audits) was evenly distributed within each of 
the groups. 
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2. If the CTO objective (number of audits) was accomplished 
in less than 37 1/2 hours per auditor, (excluding super-
visory time) the company would split the hours saved 50-
50 with the group's employees, including the supervisor. 
For example, in a group with 7 employees, the goal would 
be reached anytime the audits were completed prior to 7 x 
37 1/2 or 262.5 man hours. If, for example, this group 
met it's goal in 222.5 hours, 40 hours would have been 
saved and each of the seven auditors and one supervisor 
would each be entitled to 5 hours (40/8) of CTO. 
3. Once an audit was completed, the resulting paperwork was 
forwarded to other departments for further processing. 
If an auditor did not do his work correctly, personnel in 
other departments must go through extensive research work 
to correct it. Consequently, if any auditor errors were 
detected by departments outside the group, the group was 
penalized three audits for each error. Any penalties 
were added to the group's weekly goal. This was to en-
courage quality work. Errors detected and corrected as a 
result of a group's internal supervisory quality as-
surance process were not penalized. 
4. Employee absences due to sickness or vacation would make 
goal attainment extremely difficult or impossible, parti-
cularly during the summer vacation period. To accom-
modate the program, we reduced a group's goal at a rate 
of 1.70 audits per hour (the department's overall aver~ge 
audit rate) for each hour of auditor absence. The same 
approach was used when auditors were given special as-
signments unrelated to their audit work or when the work 
was exceedingly difficult due to circumstances (usually 
related to computer failures) beyond the group's control. 
Thus, for example, if an employee was absent five hours, 
the group would be credited with 8.5 (5 x 1.7) audits 
towards it's weekly goal. 
5. After the program began, employees were concerned about 
the issue of absenteeism. While a group was compensated 
for absences due to sickness, many employees felt it was 
unfair to share equally CTO with employees who w~re 
absent one or more days. Therefore, it was agreed that 
employees who missed more than one day would not get any 
CTO time off and that an employee who missed one day 
would only get 80 percent of the group's average eTO for 
the week. 
It should be noted that serious consideration was given to 
testing a CTO program on an individual employee basis instead of by 
group. Previous experience using company gift certificates instead 
of CTO for achieving individual productivity goals, while succes-
sful, had a serious drawback: employees were so intent upon their 
own success that the well being of group members was no longer 
9 
valued, and, in fact, became a hindrance. For example, during the 
retail Christmas season, as much as 20 percent of the work force is 
comprised of seasonal employees who must be trained by full time 
auditors. During the incentive program, these trainees did not 
receive the full attention they required for training, nor would 
experienced auditors offer to help other group auditors with dif-
ficult audits because it decreased their own productivity- If, 
however, group goals were used, it would be to everyone's benefit 
to help trainees or other group members- A subsequent survey of 
employee attitudes towards that program revealed that they would 
rather work on a group basis. 
Measures 
Objective measures were used for productivity measurement: 
the number of audits completed on a per hour basis- Standard 
procedures and reports were already in place to measure quality and 
quantity. In order to meet company deadlines, employees were 
usually required to work for the entire 37 1/2 hour week and were 
given their eTO at some later scheduled date- Each audit performed 
was accompanied by an audit statistics form which was used as a 
data entry form into a computerized productivity measuring system-
Relevant data included: store location, auditor, audit errors 
detected during quality assurance, and financial data. 
worked were submitted separately by the supervisor. 
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Hours 
Under the eTO project, two productivity measures seemed neces-
sary: productivity from the beginning of the week until the eTO 
goal was reached and productivity for the entire 37 1/2 hour week. 
The purpose of the full week's productivity measure was to de-
termine the effect, if any, of reaching the goal would have on 
group productivity for the rest of that week. If there was a sig-
nificant drop-off, then future CTO programs would be modified to 
provide eTO based on an entire week's work. 
Establishing CTO goals can be difficult. If too low, you give 
away unearned time. If too high, goals cannot be achieved and 
everyone loses as employees and management become frustrated. A 
goal of 25 percent over the existing workloads was established 
because both group members and the supervisory staff thought it was 
attainable. In the previous year, productivity was increased by 50 
per-cent so we felt that much of the "fat" had been "squeezed out". 
Achieving a 25 percent increase would require extra effort and new 
~~ays of working. 
Each group supervisor was responsible for performing a quality 
assurance (Q.A.) review of at least five randomly selected audits 
per week per auditor. The Quality Assurance process required the 
supervisor to check each selected audit for standard items: correct 
totals, accounting transmittals completed correctly, exceptions 
properly documented, etc. Auditors with audit errors were given 
immediate feedback. While auditor errors were reported as errors 
detected during a sup~rvisors' quality assurance review, penalties 
were not assessed against the audit group as long as they were de-
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tected by the group's supervisor. This procedure ensured that 
supervisors did not feel that they were hurting group CTO per-
formance by finding errors. Completed audit paperwork was forwarded 
to other departments and subsequent problems found with the work 
were formally communicated back to the respective supervisor and 
auditor. In addition, an independent random quality assurance 
review was performed on all audits which previously underwent 
supervisory Q.A. review. Errors detected and not corrected on 
audits previously reviewed by supervisors would result in penalties 
which reduced a group's eTO time. This ensured that group super-
visors were closely monitoring quality. 
Benchmark productivity measures were established for all four 
audit groups over a nine week period prior to the beginning of the 
first tests. During this period, each group's productivity was 
measured in terms of audits per hour. All changes in productivity 
(except post test comparisons) were measured against each gro~p's 
benchmark. 
While the primary thrust of this study was to evaluate CTa in 
a clerical production environment where all employees had very 
similar work duties, additional tests were conducted on four sep-
arate clerical groups (E,F,F,H) in which both the groups and em-
ployees within a given group had vastly differing responsib~lities. 
The purpose of doing additional testing was two-fold. First, if an 
opportunity for employee rewards within one area of a department is 
provided, a similar opportunity must be provided for other areas or 
non-participating employees will feel that they are being treated 
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unfairly. Perceptions of unfair treatment can cause resentment 
towards management as well as employees in eTO groups. This can 
result in work slow downs and even strikes. Secondly, management 
wanted to begin to explore methods of increasing productivity in 
clerical departments which were not suited to production line 
incentive methods. 
The common element in all non-audit groups was the requirement 
to complete financial reports within a specific time frame. Thus, 
group report completion deadlines for earning eTO were established 
for these four groups. In these tests, the number of employees in 
each of the groups was reduced by 20 to 25%. Thus, if the groups 
were able to perform their tasks with the reduced headcount, a 20 
to 25% productivity gain will have been realized. Two of the 
gr-oups (G and H) could earn an extra week's vacation if all dead-
lines were met over a six month period. The two remaining groups 
(E and F) could ecu~n an e}:tra day off l=,el-- month if reports were 
completed on an established m nthly schedule over a six month 
peri od. There were no qual it- assuran ce che cks for- any of these 
tests since errors, if detect( d, would not show up until after 
several months had passe~. At the Same time, any errors found 
would only affect these groups. Thus, any quality problems would 
be self penalizing since they would take away from their chance of 
obtaining their eTO goal. 
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RESULTS 
Productivity during the test period, for all audit groups 
(A,B,C,D) combined, improved by an average of 23.8 percent, in-
creasing from 1.72 to 2.13 audits per hour. This is shown in Table 
One. Individual group gains ranged between 13.4 and 40.1 percent. 
While improvements were noted for all groups up to the point of 
reaching their CTO goal during the week, subsequent productivity 
after the weekly goal was reached generally declined. This is 
reflected in the overall lower average productivity measures of 
1.95 shown for the entire work week compared to the CTO average of 
2.13. This measure (for the entire week) includes both CTO pro-
ductivity time and non-eTO work time. In spite of the post CTO 
weekly decline, however, the total weekly gains averaged 13.4 per-
cent. One group (A) had such low productivity after reaching its 
CTO goal for the week that they actually declined (on a total week 
comparison) from their benchmark of 1.56. Group (D) was unchanged 
~t 2.49 audits per hour for either CTO or total week measures. 
The groups averaged 3.35 eTO hours off per employee per week 
during the test period. The range was 2.06 to 4.25 depending upon 
productivity and absenteeism. Total eTO hours earned during the 
test period approximated 725. Based on the 50-50 split time sav-
ings (50% to employee? 50% to company), an equal amount of time was 
therefore available to the company for these employees to work in 
other areas· 
Post test productivity measures revealed a general pattern of 
sustained productivity gains averaging 9.9 percent above the bench-
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marks. Changes in group post test productivity ranged from a 
decrease of 8.7 percent to a gain of 22.4 percent. 
actually declined from their benchmark of 1.56 to an average of 
1.41 audits per hour during the test period. This occurred even 
though they increased to 2.12 (an increase of 36%) on the average 
up to the time they met their weekly eTO goal. 
Quality did not suffer during the course of the program. The 
number of erTor-s dete cted aver.aged 25.7 per group during the ben ch-
mark period and was only 24.3 during testing. 
The tests of the four clerical groups in which employees 
(within the groups) performed disparate tasks had mixed results. 
The two gl~OUpS (" E II and II F ") wh i ch coul d eal~n an extr'a day off each 
month were successful in reaching their goals every month even 
though they operated with 20-25 percent fewer people. The two 
groups ("G" and "H") which had to meet si>: consecutive monthly 
deadlines (after which they could earn an extra week of vacation), 
were not as successful. Two of their monthly goals were not met. 
A post-test survey was given to all employees who participated 
in the program to measure employee perception of the CTO program. 
The survey revealed that employees in the audit department were 
overwhelmingly positive about the program. On a scale of 1 (dis-
liked very much) to 10 (like very much), the main response 8.7. 
Over eighty-seven percent of the same groups also perceived the 
program as fair and one hundred percent felt the program was a suc-
cess· When asked to respond to the question, "In your opinion, did 
yOL\l~ fellow group members pull their' fair share of the l-Jork load?", 
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employees l-'esponded with 34.8% "definitely" and 65.2% "more often 
than not". 
The groups outside the audit area were somewhat dissatisfied 
with the program. In terms of fairness ("do you feel the pr'ogl~am 
was fair?"), between 28.6 and 53.8% said the program was unfair. 
Interestingly, the Reporting and Control group (H) indicated that 
over half of the employees (53.8%) saw the program as unfair but 
83.3% of the same group saw the program as successful. A complete 
summary of the survey and r-esults al--e shown in Appendi>: "A". 
DISCUSSION 
The results clearly demonstrate that a CTO program can improve 
productivity over the short term. Post testing gains (compared to 
the benchmarks) averaging 9.9 percent also indicate some permanent 
gains may also be realized. There can be, of course, no 10n1 term 
(over 12 months) conclusions. The fact that CTa productivity 
averaged 2.13 audits/hour up to the CTa goals but only averaged 
1.95 audits/hour for the entire week was not surprising. The 
groups pushed hard to reach their target and once achieved, they 
"cruised". In fact, it appears that some of them vacationed for 
the rest of the week. Group "A", for e~·:ample, aver-aged 2.12 audits 
per hour up to reaching their goal, but total weekly productivity 
actually declined to 1.41 audits per hour, below their 1.56 bench-
The implications here are that a eTa program should set 
goals or targets which would reward high productivity for the 
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entire work period be it a day, week or month. Therefore the 
present program should be modified, for example, to give a spec-
ified CTO reward (say 10 minutes) for each audit over a specified 
target. This would push the groups for the entire work period. 
Observations of each group during the test revealed a pattern 
of supervisors and individuals developing new approaches to reach-
ing their goals. Better ways were found to do the work and this 
coul d, in part, e>:p lai n the "pel-·manent" gai ns l~e fie cted in the post 
test gains of 9.9 percent overall. Thus, it is quite possible that 
a short term productivity program which pushes people to their 
"limits" can result in improved procedural or system changes which 
translate into permanent gains in the long run. Another factor, 
which could have lead to the improve~ents is that specific goals, 
if accepted, have been found to lead to higher performance than 
generalized goals (lido your best") or· no goal at all (Locke, 1968). 
In looking at the range of group benchmarks in table 1, groups 
A, B, and C were reasonably close which is reflective of the sim-
ilar type of work performed. Group D, on the other hand, at 2.18, 
performed audits which were generally easier and this explains the 
higher benchmark averages. Immediately after the eTO program, 
system changes required group D to switch over to performing more 
difficult audits. This is the probable reason group D was the one 
group to show a post test decline (-8.7%). 
Management was pleased to see that quality did not decrease 
and that it actually improved. This was probably due to the fact 
that errors could result in substantial penalties. One gr·oup (D) 
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actually perfor·med mOr·e audi ts than requi l~ed to "put some e:·:tl-·a" 
away in case of errors. 
The survey clearly indicated that employees in the audit 
groups perceived the program more favorably than the other areas 
(auditors rated the program at 8.7 versus non-auditor rating of 
5.5). This rating could be attributed to the fact that audit work, 
because of its repetitive nature lends itself to more of a "pro-
duction" environment where small changes in work patterns can lead 
to significant time savings. It is also possible that audit goals 
were set too low, thus, making achievement too easy. 
Non-audit Groups G and H were more successful and pleased with 
the pr-ogram. Their reward was a possible day off per month. On 
the other hand, Groups E and F which were on an all or nothing 
reward program, were not successful for several reasons. Two of 
their monthly goals (second and fourth month) were not met. They 
were under increasing pressure each successive month not to fail or 
all of their previous efforts would be wasted. They fr·equently met 
with management in an attempt to alter their goals. They also 
protested that many of their employees were new which kept their 
group's from being as efficient as possible. Initially, management 
resisted changing the program. However, after realizing that the 
all or nothing approach over a prolonged period was demoralizing 
to the groups, changes were made. Their goals were modified to 
require them to only meet monthly deadlines to earn single days off 
instead of the cumulative all or nothing approach. 
1 0 ..... 
Part of the disparity between audit group perceptions and the 
other groups could have resulted from an inadequate amount of plan-
ning for the non-auditor eTO programs. A lot of effort was put 
into development of the audit eTO program whereas the other pro-
grams were hastily arranged. In hindsight, it is suggested that a 
future eTO program for clerical groups who perform disparate func-
tions be assigned monthly goals with a reward at the end of each 
month. In addition, more extensive employee participati6n in the 
development of the program would be beneficial. Interviews with 
emp 1 oyees in the non-audi t gr·oups (" E", "F", "G", and "H") l~evea I ed 
that they were unhappy because the program was started when a 
relatively large number (33%) of their employees were new to both 
the company and department and did not understand their work. As a 
result, the groups could not meet their deadlines. One group of 
six employees who were all experienced, was able to easily meet 
their goals and was totally satisfied with the program which re-
warded them with an addition<il week of vacation. 
One of the benefits of a short term eTO program is that it can 
indicate how much additional productivity can be obtained from 
employees. Taken over a several month period, employees may also 
develop new approaches to performing work which can result in short 
and long-term gains. 
While audit employees enjoyed the results of the program, many 
of them expressed some pleasure when the program terminated. They 
said they were tired. of constantly pushing to meet goals. Thus, it 
is possible that this type of program may not work over a longer 
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period particularly if employees feel that the level of goal dif-
ficulty would be increased on a consistent basis. 
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 
In assessing the implications of the proposed CTO program, 
some consideration must be given to situations in which factors 
outside a group's control negatively impact the group's product-
ivity. In the present study, computer related problems made it 
occasionally impossible to earn CTO and even though fairness dict-
ated that a group was deserving. Conversely, when conditions 
change to make CTO attainment relatively easy, goal adjustments 
should be made but not to the extent that employees become alarmed 
over the possibility of job loss. 
The study would also suggest that the development of aCTO 
program should have extensive participation on a volunteer basis by 
clerical employees and should not be totally under managemen~ 
control. This ensures an atmosphere of trust which will be nec-
essal-y when problems occur in the progr-am. 
Management must also realize that a CTO program may heighten 
the issue of future staffing reductions. Employees are smart 
enough to realize this and will ask what will happen to their jobs 
as they become more efficient. To counter this, management should 
consider a written offer to eliminate jobs only through attrition. 
One of the most difficult issues revolves around how to reward 
employees within groups who perform disparate functions. The re-
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suIts of the study suggests that eTO should be aw~rded on the basis 
of meeting monthly report deadlines where possible. 
In administering the eTO program, one of the by-products was 
that supervisors had a tendency to do clerical work to help a group 
meet it's goals instead of performing supervisory functions. A 
little participation is acceptable and desirable but, too much over 
a long period is dysfunctional, because it detracts from the super-
visor's main function: supervision. Discourage this practice. 
A eTO Program can result in short term productivity gains. 
Hence, its value might lie in getting a company through a crunch. 
It might also serve as an excellent way to determine how much of a 
productivity increase can potentially be obtained in an area-
In order to maximize possible productivity gains, eTO should 
be earned on the basis of an entire week's or period's product-
ivity. This will pr·event "post goal" pl-·oductivity declines. An 
alternative would be to let employees have their time off as soon 
as goals have been reached. This assumes, of course, that there 
would be no 50-50 split of time saved with employees and, thus, 
once a goal is reached, the employees go home. 
In the present study, it is estimated that a 15 percent pro-
ductivity gain over the long-term would result in a minimum savings 
of $75,000 annually from the audit groups alone. This could go as 
high as 5300,000 if all clerical employees participated. From a 
short term perspective, savings can also occur. For example, the 
headcount reductions which occurred in the groups performing dis-
parate functions resulted in real dollar savings. In fact, they 
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were never increased back to their original levels. This has 
resulted in an annual savings of Sd5,OOO. 
FUTURE STUDIES 
While the study revealed that a eTO program would be suc-
cessful, in the short run, there is a need for longitudinal study 
to determine if and when the program will cease to becom~ effect-
ive. More specifically, further research is needed to determine 
if a CTO program be sustained over a long term (6-12 months). In 
addition, it would be important to ascertain whether a short term 
CTO program could result in permanent productivity gains. Another 
area which deserves additional study revolves around developing 
effective eTO programs for groups of employees performing disparate 
functions. 
Appendi:·: "A" 
POST CTO SURVEY RESULTS 
On the following scale of 1 to 10, please rate how you feel about 
the CTO program in your area. 
1 2 3 C ~I 6 7 0 '-' 9 
Dislike OK 
Vel~y 
Much 
'"' 
of Sur-veys Total 
Submitted Scor-e 
Sales Audit (Gr-oups A,B,C,D) 24 20'3 
Reporting & Control (Gr-oups E,F) 14 78 
Customer Accounts (Groups G,H); 10 C7 
-'-' 
GROUP TOTAL 48 340 
1. Do you feel the program was fair to all groups? 
YES NO 
!J: of Surveys 
Submitted 
Sales Audit (Groups A,B,C,C) 
Reporting & Control (Groups E,-) 
Customer Accounts (Groups G,H) 
GROUP TOTAL 
To your group? 
24 
13 
7 
44 
# of Surveys 
Submitted 
Sales Audit (Groups A,B,C,D) 
Reporting & Control (G~oups E,F) 
Customer Accounts (Groups G,H) 
GROUP TOTAL 
13 
10 
45 
% 
YES 
87.5 
46.2 
71.4 
68.4 
YES 
%. 
YES 
86.4 
46.2 
60.0 
64.2 
10 
Like 
Vel~y 
Much 
% 
NO 
12.5 
53.8 
28.6 
31.6 
% 
NO 
NO 
13.6 
53.8 
40.0 
35.f=:: 
Avel--age 
8.7 
5.6 
~ ~ 
_I • . ~ 
7.1 
For the department? 
# of Sur-veys 
Submitted 
Sales Audit (Groups A,B,C,D) 
Reporting & Control (Groups E,F) 
Customer Accounts (Groups G,H) 
GFWUP TOTAL 
19 
11 
6 
36 
YES 
YES 
68.4 
45.5 
50.0 
54.6 
% 
NO 
NO 
31.6 
54.5 
50.0 
45.4 
2. Was there anything yO! did not like about the program? 
YES NO 
# of SLIl--veys % X 
Submitted YES NO 
Sales Audit (Groups A,B,C,D) 18 38.9 61.1 
Reporting & Contr-ol (G;--oups E,F) 12 .."..". --:r .,j.~ • • .:J 66.7 
Customer- Accounts (G\~O I. 1:. s G,H), 10 70.0 30.0 
GROUP TOTAL 40 47.4 52.6 
3. Aside from your owr feelings, do you think the program was an 
overall success? YES NO 
# of Surveys % X 
Submitted YES NO 
Sales Audit (Groups A,B,C,D) .. ~~ .L.~' 100.0 0.0 
Reporting & Cont\"-ol (G\~OUPS G,H) 12 83.3 16.7 
Customer Accounts (Groups E,F) 9 55.6 44.4 
GROUP TOTAL 44 79.6 20.4 
4. In your opinion, did you fellow group members pull their 
fair share of the work load? 
Sales Audit 
(Groups A,B,C,D) 
# of Sur-veys 
Submitted 
23 
24 
7.-
34.8 
65.2 
0.0 
0.0 
Definitely 
MOl~e Often than Not 
Frequently did not 
pull the i r- own 
Neve\~ 
Reporting & 
Control 
(Groups E,F) 
Customer 
Accounts 
(Groups G,H) 
TOTAL 
# of Surveys 
Submitted % 
13 69.2 Definitely 
30.8 More (Iftel~ than Not 
0.0 Frequently did not 
pull their own 
0.0 Never 
# of Surveys 
Submitted % 
10 
# of Surveys 
70.0 Definitely 
30.0 More Often than Not 
0.0 Frequently did not 
pull their own 
0.0 Never 
Submitted % 
46 52.2 Definitely 
47.8 More Often than Not 
0.0 Frequently did not 
pull their own 
0.0 Never 
Table One 
Auditor Productivity 
A B 
Number of employees in 7 9 
group 
Benchmark audits per- hOlll~ 1 1.56 1.49 
Average audits pel-- hOUI--:::?: 2.12 1.69 
dUl~ing test period tip to 
reaching the CTO goal. 
Percent change in pr-o- 3E .. OO 13.40 
ductivity from benchmarks. 
Aver-age audits per hour:::5 1.41 1.75 
dur-ing test fOI' entire 
wOI'k week. 
Post test audits per-4 1.91 1.78 
hour-. 
Aver-age number- of CTO 4.25 2.06 
hour-s ear-ned per auditor 
Percent change of po;t test 22.40 5.30 
compal'ed to benchmad 
GI~OUpS 
C 
7 
1.57 
2.20 
40.10 
1.8f. 
1.87 
4.18 
19.50 
1. Benchmark audits per hour: The average nUlber of audits performed on a per 
hour basis by each group 0\ r a nine week period prior to the beginning of 
the first test week. 
2. Average audits per hour dur' I) test period up to reaching the CTO goal: The 
average number of audits performed on a per hour basis by each group during 
the eight week test period. This measure was from the beginning of the week 
until the CTO goal was reached during the sale week. 
3. Average audits per hour during test for entire work week: The average number 
of audits perforled on a per hour basis by each group for the entire work 
week. This leasrrfS productivity up to and subsequent to CTO goal achieve-
unt. 
4. Post test audits per hour: The average number of audits perforled on a per 
hour basis for a four week period subsequent to the test. 
D TOTAL 
10 33 
2.18 1.72 
2.49 2.13 
14.20 23.80 
2.49 1.95 
1.99 1.89 
2.89 3.35 
-8.70 9.90 
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